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This paper sheds light on a poorly understood phenomenon in microﬁnance which
is often referred to as “mission drift”: A tendency reviewed by numerous microﬁ-
nance institutions to extend larger average loan sizes in the process of scaling–up.
We argue that this phenomenon is not driven by transaction cost minimization
alone. Instead, poverty-oriented microﬁnance institutions could potentially devi-
ate from their mission by extending larger loan sizes neither because of “progres-
sive lending” nor because of “cross-subsidization” but because of the interplay
between their own mission, the cost diﬀerentials between poor and unbanked
wealthier clients, and region-speciﬁc clientele parameters. In a simple one-period
framework we pin down the conditions under which mission drift can emerge.
Our framework shows that there is a thin line between mission drift and cross-
subsidization, which in turn makes it diﬃcult for empirical researchers to estab-
lish whether a microﬁnance institution has deviated from its poverty-reduction
mission. This paper also suggests that institutions operating in regions which
host a relatively small number of very poor individuals might be misleadingly
perceived as deviating from their social objectives. Because existing empirical
studies cannot diﬀerentiate between mission drift and cross-subsidization, these
studies can potentially mislead donors and socially responsible investors pertain-
ing to resource allocation across institutions oﬀering ﬁnancial services to the poor.
The diﬃculty in separating cross-subsidization and mission drift is discussed in
light of the contrasting experiences between microﬁnance institutions operating
in Latin America and South Asia.
∗We thank Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, Marek Hudon, Marc Labie, and Jonathan Morduch
for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft. We are grateful to Annabel Vanroose
for her expertise and technical support.
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1 Introduction
What is “mission drift”? In answering this question from a microﬁnance
standpoint, we must start by looking into how the microﬁnance institutions
(MFIs) advertize themselves. What is their main mission? Suppose for a
moment, and for the sake of argument, that a particular MFI states that
its main objective or mission is poverty reduction.1 Let us assume again,
for the sake of argument, that a good proxy for poverty is average loan
size — the smaller the average loan size, the greater the depth of outreach,
to use the microﬁnance parlance.2 Then, instead of asking what is mission
drift, we could simply ask: What prompts an MFI to increase its average
loan size over time, thereby lowering outreach depth? There are two straight-
forward answers to this question. First, progressive lending, which, in the
microﬁnance jargon, pertains to the idea that existing clients can reach up
to higher credit ceilings after observing a “clean” repayment record at the
end of each credit cycle.3 Second, cross-subsidization, which entails reaching
out to unbanked wealthier clients in order to ﬁnance a larger number of poor
clients whose average loan size is relatively small. These two explanations
are in line with the MFI social objective.
Rather, mission drift relates to a phenomenon whereby an MFI increases
its average loan size by reaching out to wealthier clients neither for progres-
sive lending nor for cross-subsidization reasons. Mission drift in microﬁnance
arises when an MFI ﬁnds it proﬁtable to reach out to unbanked wealthier
individuals while at the same time crowding out poor clients. According to
this deﬁnition, mission drift can only appear when the announced mission
is not aligned with the MFI’s average loan size minimization. Because this
is often the case, our deﬁnition has the advantage of being a rather easily
observable outcome, which can be measured empirically.
Building on a comprehensive literature review from individual MFI expe-
riences by Fidler (1998), on pioneering theoretical work by Copestake (2007)
and Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008), and on recent empirical work by Cull
et al. (2008), this paper sheds light on a poorly understood phenomenon
1This is not an unrealistic assumption as shown in Section 2 of this article.
2See, for example, Mosley (1996), Armenda´riz and Morduch (2010), and Cull et al. (2008).
For a detailed discussion on the merits of this deﬁnition of poverty, see Schreiner (2001).
3See Armenda´riz and Morduch (2010) for a more complete explanation on progressive
lending and the rationale behind it.
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in microﬁnance which is often referred to as “mission drift”: A tendency
reviewed by numerous microﬁnance institutions to extend larger average
loan sizes in the process of scaling-up. We argue that this phenomenon is
not driven by transaction cost minimization alone. Instead, poverty-oriented
microﬁnance institutions can deviate from their mission by extending larger
loan sizes neither because of “progressive lending” nor because of “cross-
subsidization” but because of the interplay between their own mission, the
cost diﬀerentials between poor and unbanked wealthier clients,4 and region-
speciﬁc parameters pertaining MFIs’ clients.5 Christen (2000) lists several
factors such as strategy, and portfolio maturity. These may indeed make
the loan size larger without MFIs necessarily deviating from their poverty-
reduction.6
In a simple one-period framework, we pin down the conditions under
which mission drift can emerge. The main point resulting from our frame-
work is that there is a thin line between what constitutes mission drift and
cross-subsidization, which in turn makes it diﬃcult for empirical researchers
to establish whether a microﬁnance institution has indeed deviated from its
poverty-reduction mission.7 This paper also suggests that institutions oper-
ating in regions which host a relatively small number of very poor individuals
might be misleadingly perceived as deviating from their mission. Because
existing empirical studies cannot diﬀerentiate between mission drift and
cross-subsidization, these studies can mislead donors and socially respon-
sible investors. The diﬃculty in separating cross-subsidization and mission
4Agency problems might also enter the picture (see Aubert et al., 2009; Labie et al., 2010).
5While the focus of this paper is on microﬁnance institutions which “drift” away from their
poverty-reduction mission, where poverty is proxied by average loan size, we could also
think of situations where such a drift is triggered by proﬁt-oriented donors. As discussed
below, the latter scenario has been analyzed by Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008). Mission
drift could also be rooted in shareholders’ pursuit of a self-sustainability objective which
might take priority over their poverty-reduction objective (Hermes and Lensink, 2007).
6Henceforth, we use outreach maximization and poverty reduction mission/objective inter-
changeably.
7One way to assess empirically whether an institution has deviated from its mission is
the following: In its growth process, does the MFI crowd out the poor as the size of its
portfolio grows? However, a clean empirical analysis on this requires a well-deﬁned notion
of poverty, which further complicates the picture. Empirical researchers tend to associate
mission drift with larger average loan size. As we will argue below, this is potentially
misleading to begin with. This paper can thus be viewed as a “warning” on further
empirical research without theoretical and empirically sound underpinnings.
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drift is discussed in light of the contrasting experiences between microﬁnance
institutions operating in Latin America and South Asia.
While our model is static for the sake of simplicity, it does shed light
on the proﬁtable scaling-up process whereby, in their eﬀorts to avoid loan
arrears and monitoring costs, MFIs tend to target better-oﬀ clients in pri-
ority. Simply put: relative to poor clients, unbanked wealthier clients cost
less. MFIs’ excessive focus on (relatively costless) unbanked wealthier clients
might be motivated by proﬁt-oriented donors, and drifting from their mis-
sion might be the only way to attract more resources, in the model by Gosh
and Van Tassel (2008). Alternatively, the motivation for MFIs to drift from
their mission might be because such institutions wish to attract socially
responsible investors. Commercial MFIs are a typical example, which is
often invoked in the empirical literature. This literature generally uses as
a proxy of mission drift the larger loan sizes that commercial MFIs oﬀer
relative to the size of the loans oﬀered by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), for example. In recent empirical work by Cull et al. (2009) across
diﬀerent MFIs operating in diﬀerent regions, the proxy for poverty is average
loan size, suggesting that mission drift results from the recent microﬁnance
commercialization trend.
Taking average loan size as a proxy for poverty is gaining increasing
empirical popularity. This paper will focus on the merits of this approach
in the hope of oﬀering some guidance for empirical researchers. Our main
argument is closest in spirit to what Gonzalez-Vega et al. (1997) describe as
a “loan size creep”. That is, creeping up to larger loans to wealthier clients,
rather than growing a larger numbers of small-loan customers. A straightfor-
ward interpretation of the loan size creep idea is that increased proﬁtability
by MFIs tapping wealthier clients — who typically request a larger loan
size — is triggered by these institutions’ eﬀorts to minimize the transac-
tion costs involved in dealing with small loans, which in turn hinders self-
sustainability. In this paper, we dispel this view by showing that transaction
cost minimization alone is not at the root of a mission drift phenomenon.
Instead, MFIs serving the poor might be constrained by the number of poor
clients that can potentially be served in a particular region, as well as other
region-speciﬁc parameters. This, in turn, makes empirical eﬀorts to detect
mission drift across MFIs exceedingly diﬃcult, if not impossible. From a pol-
icy standpoint, donors and socially responsible investors should be cautious
in taking existing empirical eﬀorts suggesting mission drift. These results
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might bias donors and socially responsible investors’ decisions against fund-
ing organizations that oﬀer good ﬁnancial prospects for the poor via cross-
subsidization.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes some basic stylized
facts on the top 10 MFIs worldwide, ranked from top to bottom in terms of
clients reached, and their various missions. Four poverty-reduction mission-
driven institutions are in Asia. The three MFIs which are based in Latin
America do not advertise themselves as poverty-reduction mission-driven
institutions. Nevertheless, social orientation is clearly there. Section 3 brieﬂy
discusses the theoretical concept of mission fulﬁllment in microﬁnance.
Section 4 displays the basic model showing that a mission drift theory based
on transaction cost minimization alone can be misleading. Section 5 shows
that the most important region-speciﬁc parameters, which might diﬀer quite
widely across MFIs, are at the root of a potential mission drift. These param-
eters are decisive in any attempt to distinguish cross-subsidization from mis-
sion drift. In particular, this section shows that heterogeneity across MFIs
and regions might explain why some institutions are more prone to devi-
ate from their poverty-reduction/outreach maximization objectives. While
it remains true that some institutions might give more weight to serving
the poor, we show that there are at least two parameters which play an
important role, namely, the relative cost of serving the poor relative to
that of serving the unbanked wealthier on the one hand, and the scope for
serving larger numbers of poor individuals on the other. The interplay of
these key parameters can predict which MFIs will be more prone to devi-
ate from their outreach maximization/poverty reduction objective. Section 6
discusses the model in light of the contrasting experiences in South Asia and
Latin America. Section 7 concludes and opens avenues for future research.
2 The Poverty Reduction Mission in Perspective
Table 15.1 displays the top 10 microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) ranked by
the Microﬁnance Information Exchange (MIX) market from highest to low-
est in terms of number of clients reached. The second column delivers a proxy
for outreach as a percentage of the total population which is being served by
the MFI in question in a particular country. Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank
and Vietnam’s VBSP rank highest in terms of outreach, most likely because
the number of poor in those countries is the highest, a parameter to which
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we shall come back in greater detail later in the analysis as it captures the
notion of poverty in a controversial manner, namely, via average loan sizes.8
The last two columns show the main mission of each MFI as well as
other missions, as stated by the proﬁle of each MFI by MIX.9 At one end
of the spectrum, we ﬁnd institutions such as Bangladesh’s BRAC, whose
main mission is not just poverty reduction via the provision of ﬁnancial ser-
vices for income-generating activities, but also that of ﬁghting illiteracy and
diseases.10 These three objectives accord well with a more comprehensive
notion of poverty, as captured by the Human Development Index (HDI).11
At the other end of the spectrum, we observe South Asian seemingly for-
proﬁt MFIs such as India’s Spandana, whose main mission is to become
the largest provider of ﬁnancial services and to maximize stakeholders’ wel-
fare — poor clients could be potentially included as stakeholders but their
welfare might be equally valued relative to that of wealthier clients. This
simple comparison between two Asian MFIs takes us to the bottom of more
serious empirical ﬁndings: BRAC’s average loan size for the year 2007 is
US$188, Spandana’s $199. Can a diﬀerence of US$11 make Spandana a
mission-drifting institution relative to BRAC?
Somewhat related and contrary to the “received wisdom”, MFIs’ legal
status does not seem to appear as an important determinant of a poverty-
reduction mission. The institutional characteristics are shown in column
four. A case in point is the well-known Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, which
does not advertise itself as an NGO despite the fact that its main mission is
to alleviate poverty. In theory, the Grameen Bank is a cooperative, although
8Note, however, that outreach numbers can be misleading. While they deliver some indica-
tion of the number of clients served by institution, those numbers hide market structure
considerations. For example, the Grameen Bank, ASA, and BRAC are the three main
institutions serving nearly 20 million clients in Bangladesh. Compartamos, on the other
hand, faces little competition, and does not even serve 600 thousand clients in Mexico, in
the year 2007, according to the data provided by MIX.
9A notable example is that of the Grameen Bank, whose mission statement, as reported
by MIX is N/A. The mission statement for this particular institution was obtained from
the website of Grameen Foundation, headquartered in the United States.
10Our argument at this stage is on the main missions, as advertized by the institu-
tions themselves, not on the means to attain those objectives. In the particular case of
BRAC, the main mission is poverty reduction. The other missions are however advertized
by BRAC itself even though it uses aﬃliates like Self-Employed Women’s Association
(SEWA).
11The Human Development Index (HDI) delivers a broader notion of poverty involving
income, health, and education. For more on how this index is derived, see the Human
Development Reports, published annually by the United Nations.
December 24, 2010 12:29 9.75in x 6.5in b980-ch15 Handbook of Microﬁnance FA
348 Beatriz Armenda´riz and Ariane Szafarz
the bulk of the funds it mobilizes does not come from its members.12 The
Grameen Bank, quite independently of its legal status, is not the only MFI
advertising itself as having poverty-reduction as its main mission. In particu-
lar, four out of the top 10 MFIs state quite explicitly that exact same poverty
reduction mission. Interestingly, the four of them are located in South Asia.
In particular, and according to recent estimates by the World Bank, South
Asia continues to host the largest number of individuals living in poverty,
and this fact alone should in principle attract massive numbers of poor
into the microﬁnance industry. On the other hand, poor and middle-income
countries in, for example, Latin America are known to have underdeveloped
ﬁnancial systems making MFIs an attractive source of funding for unbanked
wealthier clients.
Identifying the notion of poverty with average loan size dates back to
Mosley (1996) who explains that Bolivia’s Bancosol deviates from its mission
by serving larger loans to wealthier clients for the sake of self-sustainability,
but at the expense of deviating resources away from the poor who request
smaller loans.13 Ever since, average loan size has become the most widely
used proxy in quantitative studies showing that some MFIs like Bancosol
might prioritize self-sustainability at the expense of their poverty-reduction
or outreach maximization mission. Moreover, MFIs often advertize small
average loan sizes as an important indicator pertaining to outreach, and as
a reinforcing signal for their main mission. Mix (2008), for example, reports
that the average loan size for the four poverty-reduction MFIs displayed
in Table 15.1 for the year 2007 was estimated to be of around USD 175
compared with USD 1,065 for the remaining six.14
12We should note that the case of the Grameen Bank is rather peculiar in that it advertizes
itself as a fully-regulated bank. In reality, however, while the Grameen Bank belongs to
its members and can therefore be deﬁned as a cooperative, the little savings it mobilizes
from its members makes it look like a “hybrid”, that is, a bank-cooperative institution.
13More precisely, the ratio of average loan size and per capita GDP. For a very compre-
hensive discussion on this, see Schreiner (2001) and Dunford (2002).
14Clearly, a per capita comparison is more meaningful. Mix does not report per capita
average loan size for the year 2007. For the year 2006, however, percentage average loan
size per capita for the four poverty-reduction MFIs was 24.94 compared to 34.6 for the
remaining six. This approximation shows that while the gap is reduced, as expected,
the 10 percentage points higher for the non-poverty reduction MFIs is not negligible.
Interestingly, region-wise, the percentages for the year 2006 show consistency. In particu-
lar, the four poverty-reduction MFIs shown in Table 15.1, all in Asia, review an average
per capita loan size of 23.94 compared to 28.31 for their non-poverty reduction counter-
parts, also in Asia. Not surprisingly, the average for three Latin American MFIs, namely,
40.89, is the highest of all.
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Somewhat surprisingly, the literature on mission drift leaves aside inter-
est rate considerations.15 Even though interest rate considerations are
beyond the scope of this paper, note that in Table 15.1, the four poverty-
reduction-driven MFIs review an estimated average interest rate of approxi-
mately 17 percent, while the remaining six charge an average of 28 percent.16
Out of these six, four are commercial MFIs.17
Thus, assuming that a good proxy of mission drift relates to the tendency
by MFIs to serve unbanked wealthier clients who request relatively large
average loan sizes can be a bit of a stretch indeed, but this is what empirical
researchers do. And they might not be totally wrong. Table 15.1 appears to
strengthen what empirical researchers might have in mind. At one extreme
is Bangladesh’s ASA, which reviews an average loan size (the lowest among
all 10) of about US$ 67 which has remained pretty stable over the past four
years. At the other extreme is Mexico’s Banco Compartamos which is above
average in terms of average loan size set at US$ 450. Banco Compartamos is
often portrayed as an example of a mission-drifting MFI. ASA, on the other
hand, is often praised as a cost-minimization institution, which has managed
to be highly eﬃcient while serving massive numbers of poor clients.
The above example illustrates rather well the meaning of mission drift
so far. Generally speaking, mission drift is observed when an MFI transits
from being a NGO to a commercial for-proﬁt bank, and during this pro-
cess it increases its average loan size.18 A typical case in point is Banco
15For a comprehensive review on interest rates, see Hudon (2007).
16The proxy for interest rates was obtained from MIX MFIs proﬁle. It is stated as “ﬁnan-
cial revenue ratio”. This is roughly cash ﬁnancial revenue divided by average gross port-
folio, which is the proxy for average interest rate use by, for example, Cull et al. (2008).
We should note, however, that unlike the MFIs that state poverty reduction as their main
mission, the interest rate range for the remaining six is huge (16.12 percent for Caja
Popular Mexicana to 68.48 percent for Compartamos).
17Cull et al. (2008) distinguish commercial MFIs and NGOs, however, showing that the
latter charge higher interest rates. Their explanation relies on the fact that NGOs face
higher costs while serving a relatively poorer clientele. In contrast, Ghosh and Van Tassel
(2008) suggest that NGOs charge higher interest rates because these type of MFIs are
funded by proﬁt-oriented donors.
18The passage of an MFI from a NGO to a fully-regulated bank is not a necessary condition
for an institution to deviate from its mission. As documented by Gonza´lez and Rosenberg
(2006), and Cull et al. (2008), relative to fully-regulated commercial MFIs, NGOs often
charge higher interest rates. Interest rate considerations should indeed be part of a more
comprehensive notion of mission drift, as suggested by Ashta and Hudon (2009) in their
work on Banco Compartamos. From a purely theoretical standpoint, and for the sake of
simplicity, however, interest rate considerations are beyond the scope of our analysis. We
nevertheless raise this important issue in the conclusion of this paper.
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Compartamos (Ashta and Hudon, 2009). The question as to why Banco
Compartamos and, more generally, Latin American MFIs have a tendency
to be more commercially-oriented relative to those MFIs which are based
in Asia, has never been raised in scholarly articles. We will try to elaborate
on this question in Section 6.19
Column six in Table 15.1 shows that MFIs might have other missions,
such as prioritizing women clients. This ﬁts well with UNDP reports showing
that women in developing economies are the poorest of the poor.20 Thus,
yet another indicator to assess if MFIs are being faithful to their poverty-
reduction mission is related to gender. Both average loan size and gender
are being considered in Cull et al.’s empirical investigation (2009) on the
commercialization of microﬁnance, and its eﬀects on poverty reduction. The
authors conclude that recent commercialization trends are “bad” news for
the poor because commercialization is being accompanied by larger loan
sizes and less focus on women.
Cross-MFI empirical studies such as the Cull et al. (2009) study should
be taken with a great deal of caution. To make our point, let’s go back for a
moment to Table 15.1 where outperformers are located in either South Asia
or Latin America, with the former generally considered a low-income region
while the latter a middle-income region. Both regions are thick in micro-
ﬁnance relative to, say, Sub Saharan Africa (Armenda´riz and Vanroose,
2009). Average loan sizes are not surprisingly diﬀerent in both these regions.
However, common sense indicates that this is normal. In particular, accord-
ing to the recent OECD report, average GDP per head in Latin America is
nearly three times higher than its Asian counterpart. The main point of this
article is that, whatever the interpretation of that such cross-MFIs regres-
sions, researchers remain unable to distinguish whether higher average loan
sizes are due to cross-subsidization or to mission drift.
Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008), on the other hand, suggest that the most
accurate approach to deal with the mission drift issue is neither loan size
nor gender, but the poverty gap ratio. Their model is most adequate for
clarifying the notion of poverty reduction and mission drift. Their approach,
however, delivers little guidance for empirical researchers, if only because
poverty is more diﬃcult to measure in practice, and because the poverty
19A notable example can be found in Rhyne (2001). However, her historical analysis
focuses mostly on Bolivia on the one hand, and is not viewed through the lens of theory,
on the other hand.
20See, for example, Armenda´riz and Vanroose (2009) and Agier and Szafarz (2010).
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gap ratio is based on poverty line estimates which are already controversial
among econometricians.21
Another diﬀerence between the Cull et al. (2009) and the Ghosh and Van
Tassel (2008) articles deserves attention. The former emphasizes commercial
MFIs, and suggests that mission drift takes place because these institutions
desire to attract more socially-responsible investors. The latter emphasizes
for-proﬁt NGOs, and suggests that mission drift results from MFIs’ eﬀorts
to attract more capital from proﬁt-oriented donors. In both papers, mission
drift is perceived as a device for attracting more capital to fund MFIs. In
both instances, the presence of a third party socially-responsible investors
in the case of Cull et al. (2009), and for-proﬁt donors in the case of Ghosh
and Van Tassel (2008) is key. In what follows, we will argue that there is no
need to complicate the picture by including donors or socially-responsible
investors in order to explain why MFIs may deviate from their poverty-
reduction mission. Simply put, the rather obscure notion of mission drift
can be elucidated without the presence of a “third party” — be these donors
or socially responsible investors.
3 Mission Drift from a Theoretical Standpoint
Somewhat surprisingly, the notion of “mission” in economics is rarely used
and studied in great detail. Instead, the literature tends to identify mission
with objective. A notable exception is a distinguished tradition in pub-
lic policy, ﬁrst started by Wilson (1989). His work focuses on incentives
for government oﬃcials to adhere to an institution’s mission. Following
Wilson’s tradition, Dewatripont et al. (1999) use a principal-agent model
a` la Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) where agents pursue multiple missions.
They show that while organizations might gain from pursuing multiple mis-
sions, they can lose focus leading to less autonomy being delegated to gov-
ernment oﬃcials (or agents).
From a purely theoretical standpoint, and with the notable exception of
Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008), modeling MFIs’ objective function adopts
a principal-agent approach to highlight adverse selection and moral hazard
issues, which can be potentially circumvented via contract design between an
MFI and peer groups. Examples of this approach abound. See, for example,
Stiglitz (1990), Banerjee et al. (1994), Besley and Coate (1995), Armenda´riz
21For an in-depth discussion, see Blundell and Preston (1998).
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(1999), Conning (1999), Ghatak (1999), Ghatak (2000), Armenda´riz and
Gollier (2000), Jain and Mansuri (2003), and Tedeschi (2006), Labie et al.
(2010), and many others.
Without underestimating the merits of the principal-agent approach
adopted by the vast majority of authors who have written sophisticated
models in order to gain important insights into optimal ﬁnancial contracting
in the absence of collateral, our approach in this article diﬀers widely in three
important ways. First, and in contrast with Ghosh and Van Tassel (2008),
our focus is in just one mission or objective to be maximized, and this maxi-
mizing objective function involves one and only one entity, namely, the MFI
itself.22 Second, that particular mission or objective is well-deﬁned: a repre-
sentative MFI is assumed to have a poverty reduction mission (henceforth:
the representative MFI is assumed to maximize outreach).23 Last but not
least, our model shows that mission drift is the result of an optimization
process by an outreach-maximizing MFI facing diﬀerent costs while serving
a heterogeneous clientele of poor and wealthier borrowers.
4 The Absence of a Transaction Cost-Driven
Mission Drift
Transaction costs are typically at the heart of most discussions on mission
drift. Using loan size as a proxy for the poverty level of clients, Cull et al.
(2008)’s recent ﬁndings indicate that MFIs with the highest proﬁt levels per-
form the weakest in terms of outreach. Also, larger loan sizes are associated
with lower average costs, which supports the idea that those institutions
that target poorest borrowers struggle in pursuit of ﬁnancial sustainability.
Do transaction costs play a crucial role at explaining why MFIs might drift
from their outreach maximization objective? In what follows, we will show
22Simply put, donors or socially responsible investors do not play any role in our frame-
work. While introducing them might help us gain important principal-agent insights
in microﬁnance, our conjecture is that our main results will remain fundamentally the
same.
23Outreach and poverty are diﬀerent notions. However, we use these two terms inter-
changeably for two reasons: First, the notion of outreach is closely related to microﬁnance
while poverty is much more general, and we wish to derive some testable implications
which are simpler to deal with using the notion of outreach. Second, entering into a dis-
cussion on what is the most accurate deﬁnition of poverty and measures relying on fussy
concepts such as the poverty line are beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion, see
Sen (1999).
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that a mission drift phenomenon, which is solely based on transaction costs,
lacks theoretical support, and is therefore misleading.
Consider an MFI which is endowed with an amount of capital, K, as its
only source of funds for extending loans to poor clients. Suppose that the
MFI serves N clients via loans of an identical amount s. Assume that the
MFI faces ﬁxed costs F (with F < K) and variable transaction cost T (N).
It follows that the MFI’s total cost is given by:
C = F + T (N) = f(N), with f(0) = F and f ′(.) ≥ 0 (1)
Assume that the MFI’s objective is to maximize outreach via micro-loans,
that is, the MFI maximizes outreach, N , by controlling the loan size, s, sub-
ject to a budget constraint. Speciﬁcally, the MFI’s maximization program is:
Max
s≥0
N
s.t. K = sN + f(N) (2)
In the absence of costs, f(N) = 0, and the MFI’s optimization function is
simply:24
Max
s≥0
K
s
(3)
and the trivial solution, for all possible values of K, is a corner solution:
s∗ = 0, N∗ = +∞.
Clearly, when f(N) = 0, total costs increase and, all things equal, higher
costs reduce the amount of resources that the MFI can use for serving its
clientele. Consider, for example, the case where transaction costs are linear,
that is: f(N) = F +yN, y > 0. Then, the MFI’s objective function becomes:
Max
s≥0
K − F
s + γ
(4)
And the optimal solution is again reached at s∗ = 0. We should note, how-
ever, that under this particular scenario, as K = sN +F + γN , the number
of (tiny) loans is ﬁnite.25 In particular: N∗ = K−Fγ . Thus, while linear
transaction costs reduce outreach, such costs alone do not alter the optimal
loan size. Moreover, as we show in the Appendix, this result is robust for
24Note that even if the MFI is a NGO receiving grants with amount linked to the size of
its loans: K = K(s), K′(.) ≤ 0, the solution remains the same.
25The capital available for loans, K, is exogenous. Moreover, we ignore the repayment
probability which, in the steady-state, could increase the value of K. Actually, at the
optimum; we have a ﬁnite number of inﬁnitesimal loans resulting in negligible repayments.
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quadratic and other types of transaction cost functions. We thus have the
following:
Result 1 : When all loans are identical, transaction costs reduce the number
of loans but do not increase their size. Therefore, the standard argument that
a mission drift phenomenon is a direct consequence of transaction costs
alone does not seem to be supported by theory.
Now suppose that the MFI can choose between two types of clients or,
equivalently, between two types of ﬁnancial products, 1 and 2, respectively.
Product 1 is available to the poor, its size, s1 ≥ 0, which is assumed to be
chosen by the MFI.26 Product 2, on the other hand, is made available to
unbanked wealthier clients. Assume that the latter clients require a minimal
size: s2 ≥ s to start up an investment project which can only be ﬁnanced
by the MFI.27 The cost function f(N1, N2) now depends on the number of
loans for each product: N1 for type 1 clients, and N2 for type 2 clients. The
MFI’s objective function in this case is:
Max
s1,s2≥0
(N1 + N2)
s.t. K = s1N1 + s2N2 + f(N1, N2) (5)
s2 ≥ s
As in the previous case, when f(N1, N2) = 0, the MFI’s optimal solution is
reached via extending an inﬁnite number of tiny loans. But as type 2 loans
are bounded by s, the MFI will only serve type 1 clients, i.e., the poor.
Note that in this setting outreach is being maximized, and that the optimal
solution regarding loan size results from the model, and not from the MFIs’
mission as such.28
The one reason which is often invoked to justify the existence of a shift
from type 1 to type 2 clients seems to be intimately related to cost consid-
erations. We consider here an asymmetric cost function making the clients
26Implicit in this assumption is that the MFI has all the bargaining power. This might
be true for several large MFIs that enjoy monopoly power. An alternative justiﬁcation to
this assumption is that the size of the loan oﬀered by the MFI is incentive-compatible.
27Implicit in this assumption is that there is only one MFI serving all clients in the loan
market. Our results will not be altered if we were to assume that the MFI is perfectly
competitive and, as long as the loan contract is incentive-compatible, both types of clients
will face the exact same loan contract from all MFIs operating in the market.
28It could not be otherwise because mission drift (larger loans) is only conceivable when
the optimization is held on another objective function.
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of type 2 less costly to the MFI. We formalize this argument by assuming
an additive cost function which gives more weight to loans of type 1.29
f(N1, N2) = γ1N1 + γ2N2, γ1 ≥ γ2 > 0 (6)
And the objective of the MFI in this case is:30
Max
s1,s2≥0
(N1 + N2)
s.t. K = (s1 + γ1)N1 + (γ2 + s2)N2 (7)
s2 ≥ s
The MFI now faces a trade-oﬀ: it can beneﬁt by adhering to its mission
via the provision of a large number of tiny loans to the poor clients at
a unit cost γ1 on the one hand, and it can proﬁtably serve a clientele of
unbanked wealthier clients who require larger loans at a lower unit cost γ2
at the expense of drifting from its poverty reduction mission on the other.
Serving clients of type 1 only will deliver, as before, a situation where s1 is
inﬁnitesimal and N1 = Kγ1 . At the other extreme, focusing on clients of type
2 only will result in s2 = s (the threshold required by wealthier borrowers)
and N2 = Kγ2+s . In this simple linear set-up, either solution is optimal,
depending on the value of the parameters. In particular, if Kγ2+s >
K
γ1
, or
equivalently γ2 + s < γ1, then, the MFI will only serve clients of type 2:
N∗1 = 0, N
∗
2 =
K
γ2 + s
(8)
Clearly, this case results from a situation where serving poor clients is
exceedingly expensive. The number of unbanked wealthier clients served,
on the other hand, decreases with the cost of serving these borrowers, and
with the start-up cost that each better-oﬀ borrower requests to make a
proﬁtable investment. But serving unbanked wealthier clients increases with
the amount of capital that the MFI can raise from donors and/or socially-
responsible investors.
29What we have in mind here is that serving the poor is more costly because more mon-
itoring eﬀort is needed, and this additional eﬀort is costly for the MFI. More generally,
this assumption may summarize all the reasons that make poorer clients less lucrative;
i.e., the poor are ﬁnancially illiterate, healthwise are less productive, have limited busi-
ness savvy, require training sessions, etc. Because our model does not explicitly spell out
loan — repayments, a simple and realistic way of interpreting this assumption is that the
additional cost incurred by an MFI that serves the poorest comes at the expense of less
capital for ﬁnancial intermediation.
30In order to avoid cumbersome notations, we assume here that F = 0, or alternatively,
that K stands for K − F .
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When γ2 + s > γ1, that is, when serving the poor is not too costly, we
have:
N∗1 =
K
γ1
, N∗2 = 0 (9)
The number of poor clients that the MFI will serve at the optimum will
again decrease with the cost of serving the poor, but increase with the
amount of capital that the MFI can raise. This analytical exercise delivers
the following:
Result 2 : In the presence of two types of clients, poor clients and unbanked
wealthier clients, an MFI facing diﬀerent transaction costs, high for the poor
and low for the unbanked wealthier, will end up serving either the poor or the
unbanked wealthier, but not both. Thus, MFIs that are faithful to their out-
reach maximization objective, do not derive any beneﬁt from having a port-
folio of poor and unbanked wealthier clients. Quite simply, MFIs do not gain
anything from serving poor and unbanked wealthier clients simultaneously.
Note that, when γ2 + s = γ1, the MFI might be indiﬀerent between serving
either type of clients, but serving the unbanked wealthier might be detri-
mental to its poverty reduction mission. Hence, mission drift cannot result
from just transaction cost diﬀerentials between the poor and the unbanked
wealthier clients.
5 MFI Heterogeneity-Driven Mission Drift
In the previous model, the two types of clients were identiﬁed with two
diﬀerent cost functions (high for the poor and low for the unbanked wealth-
ier), but both type of clients’ contributions to outreach maximization is
identical. In other words, in the scenario described in the previous section,
the MFI does not resolve its trade-oﬀ between serving poor and unbanked
wealthier clients by having a “mixed” portfolio. While wealthier clients are
cost-eﬀective, these clients do not tangibly contribute less to the MFI’s out-
reach maximization objective. Now suppose that unbanked wealthier clients
weight less in a particular MFI’s objective function. Then, unbanked wealth-
ier customers are more cost-eﬀective and therefore more proﬁtable in that
γ2+s < γ1 but they are also burdensome. As we shall soon show, this simple
characterization of the MFI objective function can lead to mission drift and
to cross-subsidization. Moreover, such an objective function is deliberately
constructed with the use of quantiﬁable and observable variables such as the
number of clients and average loan size. Speciﬁcally, the MFI maximization
December 24, 2010 12:29 9.75in x 6.5in b980-ch15 Handbook of Microﬁnance FA
Mission Drift in MFIs 357
program is:
Max
s1,s2≥0
(N1 + δN2), 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
s.t. K = (s1 + γ1)N1 + (γ2 + s2)N2 (10)
s2 ≥ s
where parameter δ captures the degree of concern that the MFI has as it
deviates from its mission via the inclusion of wealthier clients. While this
concern is MFI-speciﬁc, it can be easily captured by diﬀerences in MFIs’
proﬁles (see Table 15.1). Clearly, (10) is equivalent to (7) if one replaces N2
by N˜2 = δN2. Then: (γ2 + s2)N2 is to be replaced by
(γ2+s2)
δ N˜2, which boils
down to increasing the cost that the MFI incurs as it includes wealthier
clients in its portfolio. In the particular case where δ is chosen such that
γ2+s
δ = γ1, then both types of clients may coexist. And our main point here is
that one might ﬁnd it diﬃcult in practice to distinguish if such co-existence
of poor and unbanked wealthier clients is due to cross-subsidization or to
mission drift.
If, on the other hand, we allow for unbanked wealthier clients to be
less costly, that is, if γ2 + s < γ1 the inequalities linking the cost function
parameters become γ1 ≥ 0, γ1 > γ2, and the sign of γ2 + s can be nega-
tive.31 When γ2 + s < 0, then cross-subsidization is indeed possible. So, a
plausible explanation of what is referred to as “cross-subsidization” for an
outreach maximizing MFI could be attributed to a deliberate bias in favour
of unbanked wealthier borrowers as these borrowers are de facto creating a
positive externality on poor borrowers.
Typically, relative to rural clients, urban poor are more literate, ﬁll in
paperwork on their own more easily, and can even oﬀer some form of collat-
eral when requesting a loan to the MFI (Armenda´riz and Morduch, 2000).
Because their presence is not burdensome to the institution’s mission, an
overwhelming representation of unbanked wealthier borrowers in, for exam-
ple, urban areas might not necessarily mean that urban MFIs deviated from
31This could well be the case if the credit risk is negligible because the borrowers are
wealthy enough and the bank oﬃcers do not even bother spending time screening or
monitoring their actions. In that case, these clients oﬀer beneﬁt to the MFI rather than
costs. More generally, as our simplistic model considers K as a ﬁxed exogenous budget,
one can interpret γ1 and γ2 as net costs, i.e., the costs minus the beneﬁts associated
to expected reimbursements in a steady-state risk-neutral perspective. According to that
view, assuming γ1 ≥ 0 and γ2 + s < 0 means that the very poor clients are costly and
served solely because of the MFI social mission while less poor clients are proﬁtable to
the MFI.
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their poverty reduction mission. Distinguishing between mission drift and
cross-subsidization in practice, however, might be diﬃcult, if not impossible.
From a theoretical standpoint, however, we have just argued that cross-
subsidization is only possible when unbanked wealthier clients are proﬁtable.
Moreover, it can also be the case that the population of potential clients that
are very poor and unbanked is relatively small. Then, when looking at an
MFI’s proﬁle which is serving a large number of unbanked wealthier clients
does not necessarily mean that such an MFI is drifting from its mission. It
may well be the case that, cost-wise, there is an upper bound to the number
of poor that the institution can serve. Unbanked wealthier are relatively
more abundant than unbanked poor in many middle-income regions too,
which in turn justiﬁes further the contrast between Asia and Latin-America
discussed in greater detail below.32
Now consider the limit case where δ = 0, that is, a situation where
the MFI’s objective is serving the poor only. Then, either the unbanked
wealthier represent a proﬁtable side business (γ2 + s < 0) that does not
contribute to the mission, but oﬀers additional capital for reaching the poor.
Or, the unbanked wealthier clients are not proﬁtable (γ2 + s > 0) and are
simply neglected. In the polar case where δ = 1, the MFI gives equal weight
to both types of clients. This brings us back to equation (7). For intermediate
cases, δ ∈ (0, 1), the MFI decision pertaining to the type of clients to be
served depends on the direction of the inequality between the weight δ
attributed to wealthier clients in the MFI’s objective function, on the one
hand, and on the cost ratio γ2+sγ1 , on the other.
For any given value of δ ∈ (0, 1), in populations with a relatively large
number of poor people, the size of an MFI’s clientele in terms of depth
of outreach can be potentially large indeed. In contrast, in regions where
the number of unbanked poor is relatively small, depth of outreach is lim-
ited, and the poor can be more costly to reach, particularly in areas where
population densities are low. Consequently, the threshold required to move
from poor to unbanked wealthier clients may be region-speciﬁc. On the
32In particular (see Table 15.1), at the one end of the spectrum, we have low-income
countries like Bangladesh where income per head in 2007 was US$1400. At the other end
of the spectrum, there are upper middle-income countries like Mexico where income per
head in 2007 was US$14,500. Not surprisingly, and according to the data published by
MIX for that particular year, Grameen Bank Bangladesh alone had over six million active
clients compared to just over eight hundred thousand for the case of Banco Compartamos
in Mexico. Average loan size for the Grameen Bank was US$79, and for Compartamos
was $450. (As explained in footnote 9, MIX does not publish data on average loan size in
per capita for the year 2007 and beyond.)
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surface, outreach penetration looks considerably larger in countries such as
Bangladesh where the Grameen Bank alone reaches out to over six mil-
lion clients whose average loan size is small, relative to, for example, Banco
Compartamos in Mexico, which reaches at most 10 times less clients with
an average loan size which is three times larger. Thus, if we are to take at
face value the idea that a good proxy for an institution being faithful to its
mission is given by average loan size alone, then all MFIs, except for those
operating in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, have deviated from their
mission, which is confusing at best, misleading at worst.33
Table 15.2 summarizes the results. A good benchmark is provided by the
set of points where the MFI is indiﬀerent between its two types of clients:
γ2 + s = γ1δ. In this set, when δ increases, the cost for the MFI as it
deviates from its mission is oﬀset by its gain in terms of the number of poor
whose investment projects can be ﬁnanced. For a given δ, increasing γ1 (or
alternatively, decreasing γ2 + s) makes the MFI deviate from its mission to
ﬁnance the increasing costs of serving the poor.
What Table 15.1 shows is that the interplay between the weight that
the MFI gives to serving the poor, as captured by δ, which is MFI-speciﬁc,
the cost parameters γ1, γ2, and s which are region-speciﬁc, deliver myriad
outcomes. Chief among these are (a) mission drift, (b) no mission drift, and
(c) cross-subsidization.
Figure 15.1 represents the three possible outcomes of the model. In this
ﬁgure, the parameter γ1 has a ﬁxed positive value while γ2 + s can take any
No Mission Drift
2 sγ +
1
Mission Drift 
Cross-Subsidization
0
δ
1
γ
Figure 15.1: A representation of the possible outcomes.
33Pro Mujer in Latin America, for example, is one of the most poverty-oriented MFIs in
the world.
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real value, positive or negative, and δ varies in [0, 1]. The cost of burden-
some wealthier clients (γ2 + s on the vertical axis) is a crucial determinant
of how far the MFI can continue serving the poor. The cross-subsidization
zone corresponds to negative values of γ2+s, or “proﬁts” which the MFI can
extract from unbanked wealthier clients. With the exception of the indiﬀer-
ence line γ2 + s = γ1δ, the cross-subsidization zone is the only place in the
graph where the two types of clients can coexist. An important prediction
of our model can therefore be stated in the following:
Result 3 : Microﬁnance institutions which serve a signiﬁcant number of
unbanked poor and unbanked wealthier clients are not necessarily mission-
drifting institutions. These institutions’ commitment to contribute to poverty
reduction may be compatible with having a side business with unbanked
wealthier clients, as these clients allow for cross-subsidization for the sake
of MFIs’ outreach maximization objective.
6 Contrasting Latin America and Asia
Microﬁnance started in the mid-1970s from parallel movements in sparsely
populated Latin America and densely-populated Asia (Armenda´riz and
Morduch, 2010). It has recently been established that the two regions
where microﬁnance activity is the highest are also Latin America and Asia
(Armenda´riz and Vanroose, 2009). This is somewhat captured in Table 15.1
above where the top 10 MFIs in terms of number of clients served are all
located in either Asia or Latin America.34 Regarding poverty, recent esti-
mates by the World Bank (2004) suggest that South Asia hosts approxi-
mately 31 percent of the world’s poor while a similar estimate for Latin
America is only eight percent.
As seen in the previous section, if serving the poor is not too costly, an
outreach-maximizer MFI is unlikely to drift from its mission. This might be
the case of densely-populated South Asia where, relative to Latin America,
the poor can be more easily served, if only because the number of individu-
als considered to be poor are four times larger.35 The relative abundance of
34Christen (2000), however, point out that there is a huge diﬀerence across the very diverse
Latin-American countries; some, like Nicaragua and Haiti, might be just as poor as some
of their Asian counterparts.
35Vanroose (2009) ﬁnds a population density coeﬃcient which is positive and signiﬁcant
in determining outreach.
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poor individuals make γ1 to be considerably smaller in Asia relative to the
γ1 in Latin America. This means that for the same δ, an MFI in Asia will
ﬁnd it easy to portray itself as an MFI with a considerably higher depth of
outreach penetration.
On the other hand, the scope for cross-subsidization in Latin America
is much higher, because all countries in Latin America (with the excep-
tion of Haiti and Nicaragua) have a GDP per head which is, on average,
three times higher than the one observed in South Asia (OECD Report,
2005). Latin America as a whole remains a middle-income region. Its bank-
ing sector, however, is highly underdeveloped. Hence, our conjecture is that
the relatively wealthier but unbanked individuals in Latin America are, by
and large, being served by MFIs. And the prediction of our model is that
if serving the unbanked wealthier individuals is proﬁtable, there is ample
scope for cross-subsidization, a conjecture worth exploring empirically. This
conjecture suggests that judging an institution as having mission-drifted by
looking at the average loan size alone is misleading indeed. More information
is needed. Are such institutions a priori labeled mission-drifted institutions
keeping an important number of poor clients in their portfolio? Are poorer
clients being crowded out by wealthier clients? These are real challenges for
empirical researchers.
However, a dynamic analysis would be needed in order to assess empiri-
cally if MFIs in Latin America are scaling up and crowding out poor clients
as per Gonza´lez-Vega et al. (1996)’s deﬁnition. We strongly believe that this
observation is worth exploring. As this paper goes to press, Armenda´riz et al.
(forthcoming) are making further inquiries in this direction. These inquiries
should further guide empirical analysis, and deliver a clearer picture of
whether MFIs are indeed deviating from their missions. Important ques-
tions are up for grabs here: Is the current commercialization of microﬁnance
truly biased against the poor as the recent Cull et al. (2009) paper suggests?
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have delivered a very simple model where outreach-
maximizing MFIs can deviate from their mission. The model predicts that
mission drift will result from the interplay of MFI-speciﬁc parameters, such
as the weight that the MFI gives to serving the poor, and from country-
speciﬁc parameters pertaining to the cost of reaching the poor. From a
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policy standpoint, our model highlights that donors and socially responsible
investors can be easily misled by MFIs which are serving unbanked wealth-
ier populations. This prediction is thought-provoking as retaining unbanked
wealthier might represent a challenge for MFIs to better serve the poor.
While our model is purposely simple to guide future empirical research on
the subject, a more complete picture of mission drift should include interest
rates and market structure considerations. However, data constraints are a
major challenge here.
Besides, interest rates might be relatively high due to country-speciﬁc
considerations as well. The fact that Sub-Saharan countries host a much
larger population of poor individuals relative to Latin America, and that
outreach is higher in the latter is a clear example. This might call for subsi-
dies for MFIs which are operating in those sparsely-populated regions where
access to poor households is time-consuming, where the scope for proﬁtable
projects is limited, and where microﬁnance expertise is lacking. Again, these
region-speciﬁc considerations might oﬀer crucial guidance for donors that
prioritize social over self-sustainability objectives.
But interest rates might be also high due to monopoly power. And this
raises the question as to whether the notion of mission drift is, once more,
misleading empirical research. Monopolistic interest rates together with low
average loan size can deliver a more transparent picture of what mission drift
really means. This notion of mission drift merits further scrutiny. Ethical
considerations aside, monopolistic pricing of microﬁnance products creates
adverse selection and moral hazard ineﬃciencies. Shouldn’t this be part of
our notion of mission drift? From an empirical standpoint, going beyond
average loan size as a proxy for mission drift by at least integrating interest
rates into the picture while controlling for market structure is a step in the
right direction.
Last but not least, insights can be gained by constructing a dynamic
model. In a dynamic model, key questions as to why MFIs transit from being
NGOs prioritizing poverty to commercial MFIs prioritizing proﬁtability can
be tackled. Is this truly the case? Is client heterogeneity a necessity that
emerges over time? Why do MFIs wish to scale up in the ﬁrst place if
they risk deviating from their poverty-reduction objective? Region-speciﬁc
considerations aside, should MFIs deliberately tap wealthier clients in their
scaling-up process? Is this a viable solution for outreach growth for MFIs
to fence themselves oﬀ from a situation where donor aid dries up? Is donor
aid itself a variable which depends on outreach growth?
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Appendix
We consider the problem:
Max
s≥0
N
s.t. K = sN + f(N)
The equation G(s,N ) = K − sN − f(N) = 0 implicitly deﬁnes the function
g such that: N = g(s) that is to be maximized. Therefore, thanks to the
theorem of implicit functions:
g′(s) = −
∂G
∂s
∂G
∂N
=
N
s + f ′(N)
> 0
Consequently, for the maximization problem, the solution will always be the
corner solution s∗ = 0 leading to:
K = f(N)⇒ N∗ = f−1(K).
For example, with a quadratic transaction cost, f(N) = F + αN2, α > 0,
the optimum is obtained for s∗ = 0 and K − F = αN2 ⇒ N∗ =
√
K−F
α .
